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Juan Jose Martell is a member of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) and spokesperson
for the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC), which now forms part of the Democratic
Convergence. In May, Martell was interviewed by Pensamiento Proprio in San Salvador.
(Pensamiento Proprio is a publication of the Regional Coordination for Economic and Social
Research of Central America and the Caribbean-CRIES, Managua.) PP: What is your analysis of the
current political and economic situation in El Salvador? Martell: There is a generalized political and
economic crisis. We are in an intra-electoral period in which all the traditional political parties are
looking for the vote. Those in power have to minimize the crisis and demonstrate that they have
done something while those in opposition must exaggerate the crisis and suggest viable alternative
policies. PP: Is the Democratic Convergence planning to participate in the 1989 presidential
elections? Martell: The Democratic Convergence cannot ignore the elections. Most people view
elections as a way to express their discontent. However, if we do take part in the elections, we run
the risk of legitimizing the counter-insurgency program. Our participation would not necessarily
give total legitimacy to the elections, nor would our non-participation necessarily take away its
legitimacy. However, if we don't become involved in the electoral life of this country, we will
become an insignificant electoral force. [Ed. note: Since the interview with Martell, the Democratic
Convergence has decided to participate in the elections.] If a legally constituted political party fails
to participate in two consecutive electoral processes, it automatically loses its legality. This applies
to the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in the
Convergence but not to the Popular Social Christian Movement which has yet to become a legally
constituted party. PP: How would the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] feel about
your participation? Martell: The FMLN doesn't decide whether the Convergence participates in
elections or not, but we do discuss this question with them and with important sectors of the labor
movement. We are interested in their opinion. We won't participate because power is at stake, but
rather because we see the elections as a way to go forward towards achieving a national popular
consensus. PP: What factors account for the increase in repression and human rights violations?
Martell: We are slowly going back to the years of terror. The death squads have reappeared with
greater intensity, and although their methods are still more selective than in the old days, violence
has increased dramatically. This is due in part to the failure of the counter-insurgency program
which tried to advance minimal reforms to form a social base. It was not successful. Repressive
measures are now being used to hold back the popular movement. The death squads think that
ARENA's [Nationalist Republican Alliance] triumph [in the March elections] gives them a free hand
to operate. For example, in the city of Arce, the elected Christian Democrat mayor was threatened
and then murdered by the losing ARENA candidate. PP: ARENA must be counting on US support to
win the 1989 presidential election. Does it really have a free hand to do whatever it wants? Martell:
The new ARENA image is centered around its president who has no control over the middlelevel bureaucrats or terrorist bases which have different plans. There is a division within ARENA.
The party's president said it was irresponsible to make any connection between ARENA's victory
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in the elections and the increase in violence. This proves there is concern about this problem
by ARENA leaders. PP: Will ARENA be able to maintain the new center-right rather than ultraright image presented in the recent electoral campaign? Martell: We don't think ARENA's new
image will last long. First of all, the ultra-right is inside ARENA and Roberto D'Aubisson is the
death squad leader. Second, an ARENA triumph will strengthen hardliners in the military, many
of whom are ARENA members who would view any victory as a message to become even more
extreme. Third, ARENA would be taking power in the middle of a war and would not be able to
fulfill the promises made during the election since the war consumes all resources. PP: How do you
feel about the Catholic Church's recent call for a national dialogue? Martell: The Church's call is
very positive. We have been very concerned lately about the lack of initiative by the Church and
Archbishop Rivera y Damas to push for dialogue between the FDR-FMLN and the government.
In El Salvador, there have been many peace forums ending with nice sounding declarations of
peace that concretely have meant nothing. The Church needs to give continuity to the dialogue.
PP: Will there be enough pressure to force a dialogue? Martell: We will continue to pressure for
dialogue, but it depends on the will of the Salvadoran government and the US administration.
The most recent FDR-FMLN proposal called for a dialogue including the government, the Armed
Forces and ourselves, but such dialogue should incorporate all social sectors including private
enterprise, workers, trade unions, etc. PP: What impact has Esquipulas II [regional peace plan] had
on El Salvador? Martell: Its effects have largely been propaganda. The Salvadoran government is
not interested in peace, so compliance with the agreements has been excessively formal and done
for international consumption. There was a limited amnesty, but apparently in El Salvador the life
of a North American is worth more than that of a Salvadoran. This is shown by the fact that those
accused of killing the US Marines in the Zona Rosa were not granted amnesty, but military officers
responsible for the Las Hojas massacre in Sonsonate were freed. The amnesty was used to release
military people who committed war crimes. The National Reconciliation Commission [established
in compliance with the peace plan] does not exist anymore: the political parties have resigned from
it. Bit by bit the spirit of Esquipulas II will disappear from the statements made by the government.
Martell: How will the US elections effect the situation here? PP: A Republican victory would not
automatically mean the continuation of the previous administration's policies. Both Republicans
and Democrats are looking for new formulas due to the failure to date of current ones. I think that
with either a Democratic or Republican president, there will be a new policy for the region. PP: Do
conditions exist for an insurrection? Martell: Objective conditions exist for an insurrection, such as
very high unemployment levels, increasing repression etc., but we do not believe that people see
the FDR-FMLN as an alternative for power as they did in 1980. They do not think the FMLN can win
militarily right now and they see its political weaknesses. However, we do not discard the possibility
of insurrection nor do we oppose it. Such an insurrection is a popular right. One interesting fact
to note is that insurrections here have always been tied to elections or an electoral fraud, such
as in 1932, 1972, and 1977. PP: Are you saying that an insurrection might occur in the next year?
Martell: You cannot time an insurrection, they are often spontaneous. Popular organizations must
be ready to orient and direct a popular response. But we think that with or without an insurrecton,
a negotiated political solution will be necessary. One does not contradict the other. We are certain
that in the next year, neither army will destroy the other, and the search for a military solution will
lead only to a prolongation of the war and much greater destruction. We think a political solution is
more likely. PP: With increased US aid, has the Salvadoran Army been able to improve its position?
Martell: Since 1980, aid has gradually increased to $2 million per day. Despite the enormous increase
in funds received this year, the army has been unable to take military initiatives. The army cannot
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control the transport stoppages, the ongoing sabotage, the destruction of electric pylons, and the
FMLN's military ambushes. What this shows is the complete incapacity of one of the best equipped
armies in the region. Inside the Armed Forces, there is a considerable degree of concern over their
inability to contain the guerrillas, and, there are conflicts between the High Command and the
field commanders. Many politicians and former military officers are also clashing with the High
Command. For example, former colonel Sigfrido Ochoa, who comes from the generation of present
field commanders, strongly attacked the High Command in recent declarations. For some soldiers,
military service is only a means to a salary. Although not publicized, the rate of troop desertion is
very high and the army does not have the capacity to capture, punish, or force them to return. With
forced recruitment, the army faces two problems. First, people do not want their children to die in
a war that is not their own, and the army loses face every time it drags people out of their homes.
Second, because the guerrillas have been expanding their area of influence, the army is fearful of
recruiting men from zones with a guerrilla presence for fear of infiltration. Thus they concentrate
their forced recruitment in areas with less guerrilla presence such as Sonsonate.

-- End --
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